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Real-world expertise provides a valuable opportunity to understand how experience
shapes human behavior and neural function. In the visual domain, the study of expert
object recognition, such as in car enthusiasts or bird watchers, has produced a large,
growing, and often-controversial literature. Here, we synthesize this literature, focusing
primarily on results from functional brain imaging, and propose an interactive framework
that incorporates the impact of high-level factors, such as attention and conceptual
knowledge, in supporting expertise. This framework contrasts with the perceptual view
of object expertise that has concentrated largely on stimulus-driven processing in visual
cortex. One prominent version of this perceptual account has almost exclusively focused
on the relation of expertise to face processing and, in terms of the neural substrates,
has centered on face-selective cortical regions such as the Fusiform Face Area (FFA). We
discuss the limitations of this face-centric approach as well as the more general perceptual
view, and highlight that expert related activity is: (i) found throughout visual cortex, not just
FFA, with a strong relationship between neural response and behavioral expertise even in
the earliest stages of visual processing, (ii) found outside visual cortex in areas such as
parietal and prefrontal cortices, and (iii) modulated by the attentional engagement of the
observer suggesting that it is neither automatic nor driven solely by stimulus properties.
These findings strongly support a framework in which object expertise emerges from
extensive interactions within and between the visual system and other cognitive systems,
resulting in widespread, distributed patterns of expertise-related activity across the entire
cortex.
Keywords: expertise, object recognition, visual perception, fMRI, review, visual cortex

WHAT IS EXPERTISE AND WHY IS IT IMPORTANT TO
STUDY IT?
Understanding the impact of experience on human behavior and
brain function is a central and longstanding issue in psychology
and neuroscience. One approach to this question has been to
investigate people with exceptional skill, or expertise, in various
domains (e.g., chess, wine-tasting, bird watching) and determine
how expert processing and the neural substrates supporting it
differ from those in novices. Most broadly, expertise is defined
as consistently superior performance within a specific domain
relative to novices and relative to other domains (Ericsson and
Lehmann, 1996). For example, top soccer players such as Cristiano Ronaldo, may excel at kicking soccer balls but not at pitching
baseballs.1 While there are many possible domains of expertise
engaging diverse facets of human cognition, including perception,
attention, memory, problem solving, motor coordination and
action (Ericsson et al., 2006), they all provide an opportunity
to study the effect of some of the most extreme and prolonged
naturally occurring forms of experience on neural function.
1 http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/soccer-insider/wp/2013/08/01/

soccer-and-society-cristiano-ronaldo-juggles-baseball-at-dodger-stadium/
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In this article, we will focus on expert visual object recognition,
which is an acquired skill certain people show in discriminating
between similar members of a homogenous object category, a
particularly demanding perceptual task (Jolicoeur et al., 1984;
Hamm and Mcmullen, 1998). Face recognition is, arguably, the
quintessential example of object expertise, as almost all humans
have extensive experience with faces and show remarkable face
recognition abilities (Carey, 1992; Tanaka, 2001; although see
evidence of significant individual differences: Bowles et al., 2009;
Zhu et al., 2010; Wilmer et al., 2012). However, some individuals
develop expertise for other very specific object categories. For
example, ornithologists are very adept at identifying different
types of birds, which all share common features (e.g., feathers,
beak) but are distinct from other animals (Rosch et al., 1976;
Johnson and Mervis, 1997; see Figure 1A for examples of different
domains of object expertise). Such expertise may extend into
even more homogenous groups such as different kinds of wading
birds (Johnson and Mervis, 1997; Tanaka et al., 2005). At an even
more specific level, dog show judges have enhanced recognition
of individual dogs only within the particular breeds they are
familiar with (Diamond and Carey, 1986; Robbins and Mckone,
2007). Similarly, car experts can distinguish between different car
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visual areas but distributed (e.g., Haxby et al., 2001) and highly
interactive (e.g., Mahon et al., 2007), with the specific regions
engaged defined by the domain of object expertise and the particular information utilized by the expert (Op de Beeck and Baker,
2010a,b; Van Der Linden et al., 2014). Through experience, this
information comes to be extracted and processed through specific
observer-based mechanisms both within the visual system (e.g.,
tuning changes) and between visual regions and extrinsic systems,
key amongst which are those supporting long-term conceptual
knowledge and top-down attention (Figure 1C). More broadly,
we suggest that such interplay between different neural systems is
a common feature of all forms of expertise. This interactive framework contrasts with the view of expertise as a predominantly
sensory or perceptual skill supported by automatic stimulusdriven processes localized within category-selective visual regions
in occipitotemporal cortex (e.g., Bukach et al., 2006).
We will first describe the perceptual view of visual object
expertise, contrasting it with an interactive view, before focusing
on the face-centric account of expert object recognition. This
account has had a large influence the field of object expertise but
we will highlight its major theoretical and empirical limitations.
Finally, we will discuss evidence in favor of an interactive account
and conclude by suggesting how this account can be generalized
to explain other forms of expertise.

THE NEURAL SUBSTRATES OF EXPERT VISUAL OBJECT
RECOGNITION
FIGURE 1 | Expert visual object recognition. (A) Expertise in visual object
recognition has been demonstrated in several domains, including cars (e.g.,
Kanwisher, 2000; Rossion and Curran, 2010; Harel and Bentin, 2013), dogs
(Diamond and Carey, 1986; Robbins and Mckone, 2007), birds (e.g.,
Johnson and Mervis, 1997; Kanwisher, 2000), x-rays (Harley et al., 2009),
fingerprints (Busey and Vanderkolk, 2005), and chess (e.g., Krawczyk et al.,
2011; Bilalic et al., 2012). (B) Discrimination performance of car experts and
car novices with cars and airplanes. Relative to naïve observers (novices),
car experts are very good at telling whether two car images varying in color,
view and orientation are of the same model or not. However, when these
car experts have to perform a similar task with airplane images, their
performance drops dramatically and is as equally poor as of novices. This
exemplifies the definition of expertise as consistently superior performance
within a domain relative to other people and other domains. Figure adapted
from Harel et al. (2010). (C) A schematic representation of the different
levels of visual representation that may be modified by expertise (simple
features, intermediate complexity features, holistic and conceptual
representations). Here we highlight the interaction between these different
representational levels in the visual system. There will be further
interactions between visual representations and the higher-level conceptual
system representing domain-specific knowledge.

models (Bukach et al., 2010; Harel et al., 2010), or make adhoc distinctions, such as between Japanese and European cars
(Harel and Bentin, 2013), even across variations in color, view
and orientation. However, this car expertise does not extend to
other similar domains, such as other modes of transportation
(e.g., airplanes) (Figure 1B).
In this article, we primarily focus on the mechanisms that
support expert visual object recognition through an examination of their neural correlates. We argue that the neural substrates of expert object recognition are not discretely localized in
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PERCEPTUAL VIEW OF EXPERTISE

What underlies expertise in object recognition? Since the hallmark of expert object recognition is making very fine discriminations between similar stimuli, one intuitive possibility is that
expert object recognition primarily entails changes to sensory
or perceptual processing (Palmeri et al., 2004). Thus, attaining
any form of visual expertise should be supported primarily by
qualitative changes in processing within specific regions of visual
cortex (Palmeri and Gauthier, 2004). We refer to this notion as the
perceptual view of expertise. To the extent that any changes affect
the bottom-up, sensory processing of visual information, expert
processing under this perceptual view is automatic and stimulusdriven, with little impact of attentional, task demands or other
higher-level cognitive factors (Tarr and Gauthier, 2000; Palmeri
et al., 2004).2
This perceptual view of expertise is supported by the
experience-dependent changes in neural tuning in areas of visual
cortex reported in studies of perceptual learning (e.g., Karni and
Sagi, 1991), that is, “practice-induced improvement in the ability
to perform specific perceptual tasks” (Ahissar and Hochstein,
2 Note

that the perceptual view of expertise does not claim that the task used
for the training is irrelevant (in fact it is critical for inducing expertise, see
Tanaka et al., 2005), but rather, that real-world experts (who are superior in
within category discrimination) automatically try to individuate objects from
their domain of expertise irrespective of the task at hand. In other words,
once experts master the ability to individuate exemplars, they cannot view
their objects of expertise without attempting to individuate them. Thus, one
should distinguish between task-specific learning effects (e.g., Tanaka et al.,
2005; Wong et al., 2009b) and task-dependence following expertise training
(e.g., Rhodes et al., 2004).
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2004). For example, neurons in early visual areas (V1–V4) have
been reported to show stronger responses and narrower orientation tuning curves following extensive training on orientation
discrimination tasks (e.g., Monkey: Schoups et al., 2001; Yang
and Maunsell, 2004. Human: Schiltz et al., 1999; Schwartz et al.,
2002; Furmanski et al., 2004; Yotsumoto et al., 2008; for a recent
review see Lu et al., 2011). Further, long-term training with
artificial objects in both human (e.g., Op de Beeck et al., 2006;
Yue et al., 2006; Wong et al., 2009b; Zhang et al., 2010) and
non-human primates (e.g., Kobatake et al., 1998; Op de Beeck
et al., 2001; Baker et al., 2002; Woloszyn and Sheinberg, 2012)
have revealed specific changes in the response of high-level visual
cortex such as increases or decreases in response magnitude and
increased selectivity for trained objects and task-relevant stimulus
dimensions (for review, see Op de Beeck and Baker, 2010b). For
example, Op de Beeck et al. (2006) trained human subjects for
approximately 10 h to discriminate between exemplars in one of
three novel object classes (“smoothies”, “spikies”, and “cubies”).
Comparison of fMRI data before and after training revealed
training-dependent increases and decreases in response across
distributed areas of occipitotemporal.
INTERACTIVE VIEW OF EXPERTISE

While these perceptual learning and training studies demonstrate
changes in visual cortex with experience, such visual perceptual
experience is only one aspect of real world object expertise.
Objects, particularly real world natural objects embody rich
information not only in terms of their appearance, but also in
their function, motor affordances, and other semantic properties.3 Given these extended properties, the cortical representations
of objects can be considered conceptual and distributed rather
than sensory and localized (Mahon et al., 2007; Martin, 2009;
Carlson et al., 2014). Experts and novices are distinguished by
differences in these conceptual associations, since long-term real
world expert object recognition is accompanied by the ability to
access relevant and meaningful conceptual information that is
not available to non-experts (Johnson and Mervis, 1997; Barton
et al., 2009; Harel and Bentin, 2009; Gilaie-Dotan et al., 2012).
However, conceptual properties of objects have not typically been
manipulated in training studies such as those described above
(but see Gauthier et al., 2003; Weisberg et al., 2007). Thus,
in the acquisition of expertise, conceptual knowledge develops,
along with other observer-based high-level factors (e.g., autobiographical memories, emotional associations) in conjunction with
experience-dependent changes in perceptual processing (Johnson
and Mervis, 1997; Johnson, 2001; Medin and Atran, 2004), leading to a correlation between discrimination ability and conceptual
knowledge within the domain of expertise (Barton et al., 2009;
Dennett et al., 2012; McGugin et al., 2012a).
A complete account of real world expert object recognition
cannot ignore these factors, and must specify how stimulusbased sensory-driven processing interacts with observer-based
3 One of the most striking examples of the importance of semantic information

to object recognition comes from visual associative agnosia, in which patients
show intact shape processing but are unable to connect it to visual knowledge
of the object (McCarthy and Warrington, 1986; Farah, 2004).
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high-level factors. For example, the expert’s increased knowledge
and engagement may guide the extraction of diagnostic visual
information, which in turn, may be used to expand existing
conceptual knowledge. We refer to this experience-based interplay
between conceptual and perceptual processing as the interactive
view of expertise. This interactive view of expertise contrasts
with the perceptual view of expertise (i.e., as automatic, domainspecific, and attention-invariant) and echoes a more general
view of visual recognition as an interaction between stimulus
information (“bottom-up”) and observer-based cognitive (“topdown”) factors such as goals, expectations, and prior knowledge
(Schyns, 1998; Schyns et al., 1998; Lupyan et al., 2010). It is
important to note while the interactive view does not support a
strict stimulus-driven view of expert processing, it also does not
suggest that the effects of experience are driven solely by top-down
factors that operate independently of the perceptual processing in
sensory cortex (for such a view, see Pylyshyn, 1999). Rather, we
argue expertise arises from the interaction of sensory-driven and
observer-based processing.
In terms of natural experience, faces perhaps best exemplify
the combination of visual and conceptual properties that underlie
object expertise. Faces are not only a distinct category of stimulus
within which we make fine-grained discriminations, but are also
typically associated with rich social, biographic and semantic
information. Thus, faces seem the ideal domain to study realworld expert object recognition. And indeed, such considerations have led to an approach of studying expertise through the
prism of face recognition. However, somewhat unfortunately,
this approach has been dominated by the perceptual approach
to expertise, focusing almost entirely on the visual aspects of
processing while ignoring the influences of higher-level cognitive
factors on the visual processing. We discuss this perceptually dominated face account of expertise in the following section, before
presenting our interactive view of expertise in greater detail.
THE FACE ACCOUNT OF EXPERT OBJECT RECOGNITION AND FUSIFORM
FACE AREA (FFA)

Face perception shows a number of specific behavioral markers (e.g., stronger effects of inversion (Yin, 1969)) not typically
observed for other categories of visual stimuli that are thought to
reflect specialized processing mechanisms. However, it has been
claimed that some of these same markers can be observed for
expert object recognition, leading to the suggestion that the face
processing and expertise shared a common mechanism. In their
seminal paper, Diamond and Carey (1986) reported that dog
experts display a similar decrement in recognition of inverted
compared to upright dogs (but see Robbins and Mckone, 2007
for a failure to replicate). They reasoned that the inversion effect
emerges if three conditions are met: (1) members of an object
category must share a prototypical configuration of parts; (2)
it must be possible to individuate the members of the category
on the basis of second-order relational features (spatial relation
of the parts relative to their prototypical arrangement); and (3)
the observers must have the expertise to exploit such features.
According to this perceptual theory of expertise, acquiring expertise in object recognition leads to a unique mode of perceptual
processing, namely, transitioning from a feature-based mode of
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processing into what is often referred to as a “holistic” mode of
processing.4 Consequently, this processing strategy was suggested
to underlie expertise with objects in general (Gauthier et al.,
2003).
In this context, many studies have compared expert and face
processing to provide insight into the mechanisms of object
expertise. When experts view objects from their domain of expertise, some studies have reported effects analogous to those found
with faces. These include behavioral (Gauthier and Tarr, 1997,
2002), electrophysiological (Tanaka and Curran, 2001; Rossion
et al., 2002; Gauthier et al., 2003; Scott et al., 2008) and neuroimaging (Gauthier et al., 1999, 2000) measures. However, other
studies find conflicting results (Carmel and Bentin, 2002; Xu et al.,
2005; Robbins and Mckone, 2007; Harel and Bentin, 2013) and
much of evidence supporting the face account of expertise is controversial. In particular, it has been argued that the data presented
in these studies is not sufficient to conclude that object expertise
engages the same mechanisms as face perception (for detailed
discussion see McKone and Kanwisher, 2005; McKone et al.,
2007; McKone and Robbins, 2011). Here, we will focus on the
neuroimaging evidence on expertise, which has predominantly
investigated the role of the Fusiform Face Area (FFA; Kanwisher
et al., 1997), a region in ventral temporal cortex that responds
more when people view faces compared to other objects.
Broadly, there are two possible accounts of the face selectivity
in FFA: (i) Stimulus driven—this region is specialized for processing faces only (Kanwisher, 2010)5 or (ii) Process-driven—
this region is specialized for a specific computation (i.e., holistic
processing) that is recruited when processing faces but can also
be recruited for any object of expertise (Tarr and Gauthier,
2000). Under this process-driven account, any category of objects
that share a prototypical configuration of features and require
experience to discriminate between its members will engage the
FFA (Gauthier and Tarr, 2002; McGugin et al., 2012b).
Supporting the process-driven account, Gauthier and colleagues reported that FFA showed a higher response to objects of
expertise than to other everyday objects both in real-world experts
(bird and car experts) (Gauthier et al., 2000; see also Xu, 2005)
and in laboratory-trained experts with novel objects—“Greebles”
(Gauthier et al., 1999). They suggested that FFA is recruited whenever expert fine discriminations among homogeneous stimuli
are required. Thus, the expertise-enhanced response of FFA was
suggested to be: (i) specific to categories with exemplars sharing a
prototypical configuration of parts and (ii) independent of visual
shape, as the increase in response was found for diverse objects
of expertise (Greebles, cars, and birds). Later studies reported
4 Broadly

defined, holistic processing refers to the calculation of the relations
between the parts of the object rather than the piecemeal processing of
individual object parts (for a review see Maurer et al., 2002). The term holistic
is notorious in the face perception literature for its many definitions and
associations (Gauthier and Tarr, 2002). In the present article, we use the term
holistic in its most general, inclusive sense subsuming first- and second-order
configural representations as well as holistic (integral) processing.
5 Although the stimulus-driven account has often been linked to the notion of
innate face processing, this is a separate issue. This account does not reject a
role of experience, but suggests that experience contributes to the formation
of stimulus-driven representations.
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similar response enhancement in FFA (or in its vicinity) using
chess configurations in chess experts (Bilalic et al., 2011; Righi
et al., 2010). Response enhancement in FFA was also observed
in children who were experts with Pokémon cartoon characters
but not for Digimon characters with which they had no expertise
(James and James, 2013).
However, the claim that the FFA supports expert object recognition is highly debated and is subject to much controversy. In
particular, many studies have failed to find an increased response
to objects of expertise in FFA: with real world expertise (GrillSpector et al., 2004; Rhodes et al., 2004; Krawczyk et al., 2011),
with short-term laboratory training (Op de Beeck et al., 2006;
Yue et al., 2006) and even with the Greeble stimuli used in
the original studies (Brants et al., 2011). Further, the presence
of any expertise effect in FFA may reflect the perceived nature
of the stimuli, particularly their resemblance to faces (Op de
Beeck et al., 2006; for a discussion, see Sheinberg and Tarr,
2010).
Beyond these empirical concerns, it is important to note,
that while this perceptual face-centric approach has generated a
considerable body of research, it has major theoretical drawbacks
for understanding the general nature of expert object recognition.
These limitations are particularly evident in neuroimaging, where
the theoretical discussion of the neural substrates of expert object
recognition has seemingly reduced to the question of whether
FFA is critically engaged in expertise (Xu, 2005; Bilalic et al.,
2011; McGugin et al., 2012b) or not (Grill-Spector et al., 2004;
Rhodes et al., 2004; Krawczyk et al., 2011), largely ignoring any
neural signatures of expert object recognition beyond FFA that
are nonetheless unique to expertise. In fact, even faces themselves
elicit selective activation in many more regions than just the
FFA, recruiting a whole network of cortical regions including
the Occipital Face Area (OFA), Superior Temporal Sulcus (STS),
Anterior Temporal Lobe (ATL), Ventrolateral Prefrontal Cortex
(VLPFC), and the amygdala (for a review see Haxby and Gobbini,
2011). Further, information about faces is not restricted to these
face-selective regions but is distributed across the ventral occipitotemporal cortex (Haxby et al., 2001; Susilo et al., 2010). All
these regions may be highly relevant to different aspects of face
expertise, for example distinguishing facial expressions supported
by STS (Said et al., 2010; Pitcher et al., 2011), accessing information about unique identity invariant to visual transformations
supported by ATL (Quiroga et al., 2005; Simmons et al., 2010),
and processing of specialized facial features, such as the eyes,
supported by VLPFC (Chan and Downing, 2011; for a review see
Chan, 2013).
Thus, there is little theoretical justification for focusing solely
on the FFA when many other regions, including those outside
visual cortex, show the ability to support expertise with faces.
Indeed, while faces are certainly a central domain of human visual
expertise there are actually no a-priori reasons why the unique
characteristics associated with their perceptual processing (such
as holistic processing or activation of the FFA) should serve as a
benchmark for all domains of object expertise. More generally, as
we discuss in the next section, there is ample evidence that the
neural manifestations of object expertise can be found not only in
visual cortex, but also in many other cortical areas.
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BEYOND FUSIFORM FACE AREA (FFA): EVIDENCE FOR THE BROADLY
DISTRIBUTED NATURE OF EXPERTISE

Despite the strong focus on FFA in the perceptual account of
expertise, it’s clear that expertise-related activations for nonface objects are found outside FFA and even outside other
face-selective regions. In fact, even the early fMRI studies of
Gauthier and colleagues revealed expertise-related activations in
the face-selective OFA and in other regions of occipitotemporal
cortex including object-selective Lateral Occipital Complex (LOC;
Malach et al., 1995), and scene-selective Parahippocampal Place
Area (PPA; Epstein and Kanwisher, 1998). Subsequent fMRI studies of expert object recognition also reported expertise-specific
activity outside of FFA (Harley et al., 2009; Krawczyk et al., 2011),
and long-term training with artificial objects has been reported
to elicit changes in many parts of occipitotemporal cortex (Op
de Beeck et al., 2006; Yue et al., 2006; Wong et al., 2009b; Brants
et al., 2011; Wong et al., 2012) as well as in areas outside visual
cortex such as STS (Van Der Linden et al., 2010), posterior parietal
cortex (Moore et al., 2006) and prefrontal cortex (Moore et al.,
2006; Jiang et al., 2007; Van Der Linden et al., 2014).
To test the full extent of the neural substrates of expert object
recognition across the entire brain, Harel and colleagues presented car expert and novice participants with images of cars,
faces, and airplanes while performing a standard one-back task,
requiring detection of image repeats (Harel et al., 2010, Experiment 1). Directly contrasting the car-selective activation (cars
vs. airplanes) of the car experts with that of the novices revealed
widespread effects of expertise, which encompassed not only
occipitotemporal cortex, but also retinotopic early visual cortex
as well as areas outside of visual cortex including the precuneus,
intraparietal sulcus, and lateral prefrontal cortex (Figure 2A).
These distributed effects of expertise suggest the involvement
of non-visual factors, such as attention, memory and decisionmaking in expert object recognition (Harel et al., 2010; Krawczyk
et al., 2011; Bilalic et al., 2012). Note that these patterns of
activation represent the interaction between object category and
group (experts/naïve observers), that is, reflecting car-selective
activity that is greater in experts relative to novices. Thus the
expert modulation of early visual cortex cannot be explained
away by suggesting that low-level differences in the categories
compared are driving the effect (McGugin et al., 2012b). Further,
the lack of a difference in activation for faces between the experts
and novices argues against a general motivational explanation.
The work discussed so far has focused on the activation differences between experts and novices at a group level. However,
recently it has also been suggested that the critical test of the
involvement of a region in object expertise is whether its response
to objects of expertise correlates with the degree of expertise
(Gauthier et al., 2005; Harley et al., 2009). Using this criterion,
McGugin et al. (2012b), in a high-resolution fMRI study at 7T,
reported that car selectivity in FFA correlates with car expertise
(but see Grill-Spector et al., 2004 for a conflicting result). While
these data, if taken alone, would appear to support the processdriven account of FFA, the focus on FFA may again be misleading. Importantly, significant correlations were found in many
areas outside occipitotemporal cortex including lingual gyrus, and
precuneus, strongly resembling the spatial distribution of expert
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activations of Harel et al. (2010; Figures 2A, B). Furthermore,
within visual areas, significant correlations between car selectivity
and expertise were found not only in face-selective voxels but also
in non-selective voxels. Overall, if correlation between degree of
expertise and response to objects of expertise is the critical marker
for the neural substrates of expertise, these results suggest the
involvement of a number of distributed regions and suggest no
privileged status of face selectivity.
While the correlation findings of McGugin and colleagues suggest widespread effects of expertise, due to the nature of the highresolution scanning the imaged volume was restricted to parts
of occipitotemporal cortex. Importantly, data was not acquired
from early visual cortex, a region implicated in expertise effects
by Harel and colleagues. To replicate the findings of McGugin
and colleagues and see if the correlation effects extend even to
early visual cortex (suggesting task-based attentional modulation
of visual activity: Watanabe et al., 1998), data from Harel et al.
(2010) was re-analyzed computing the correlation between a
behavioral measure of expertise (pooled across car experts and
novices) and the response to cars in a number of functionallydefined regions in visual cortex (Harel et al., 2012). Not only was
a positive correlation found in FFA, but also in scene-selective PPA
and object-selective LOC. Critically, a positive correlation was
also found in early visual cortex, highlighting a general tendency
across cortex for car selectivity to correlate with behavioral expertise (Figure 2C). Together, these results suggest that even when
considering the specific correlation between activity and level of
expertise, the neural basis of visual expertise is not relegated to
specific “hot spots” in high-level visual cortex such as FFA (or
any other single localized region, for that matter), but is rather
manifest in a widespread pattern of activity specific to the domain
of expertise, which may reflect the engagement of large-scale topdown attentional networks (Downar et al., 2001; Corbetta and
Shulman, 2002).
These findings of widespread expertise effects across the cortex
argue strongly against the perceptual view of expertise and instead
support a framework in which a wide variety of different regions
and processes generate expert performance. This characterization
is in keeping with the critical role that non-perceptual factors
play in distinguishing experts from novices. Having discussed the
evidence for the engagement of both stimulus-driven and highlevel cortical regions, we now turn to studies demonstrating how
their interaction supports expertise.

BEYOND PERCEPTION: EVIDENCE FOR THE INTERACTIVE
NATURE OF EXPERTISE
The interactive view of object expertise proposes that expert
object recognition depends on both sensory stimulus-driven
processing as well as more high-level cognitive factors with a
critical interaction between these processes, whereby the expert’s
increased knowledge and attention guides the extraction of diagnostic visual information. Indeed, we suggest that a theory
of expert object recognition cannot be complete without taking both perceptual and top-down contributions into account.
Evidence for this interaction comes from behavioral and neuroimaging studies from various domains of visual expertise that
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FIGURE 2 | Widespread distributed effects of expertise across the
cortex. Comparison of car expertise-related effects reported by (A)
McGugin et al. (2012b) and (B) Harel et al. (2010). Common regions outside
FFA visible in both maps include lingual gyrus/collateral sulcus (CoS),
precuneus, and STS. Importantly, the field of view used by McGugin et al.
(outlined in black) did not include early visual cortex, but expertise effects
were observed by Harel et al. (2010) in these areas. (C) Re-analyzed data
from Harel et al. (2010), Experiment 1 showing correlations between
behavioral car expertise (car discrimination relative to airplane

involve interactions among diverse high-level cognitive processes,
particularly task-based attentional engagement and domainspecific conceptual knowledge. We first focus on two of the
domains of expertise that have been most intensively investigated
(cars, chess), followed by a brief review of other domains of
expertise, focusing in particular on spatial navigation and reading.
EXAMPLE OF INTERACTIONS WITH TASK-BASED ATTENTION IN
CAR EXPERTISE

As noted above, the expertise effects found in Harel et al. (2010),
Experiment 1 are so widespread, it seems most plausible that
they reflect some non-specific effect, such as the increased level
of top-down engagement that the experts have with their objects
of expertise. For example, experts may direct more attention to
their objects of expertise (Hershler and Hochstein, 2009; Golan
et al., 2014), leading both to the increased activation observed
inside (Kanwisher, 2000; McKone et al., 2007) and outside (Harel
et al., 2010) FFA. Thus, an alternative account is that the enhanced
activation observed for objects of expertise reflects a top-down
attentional effect rather than the operation of an automatic
stimulus-driven perceptual mechanism (Harel et al., 2010).
To directly test the role of attention in expertise, Harel
et al. (2010), Experiment 2 explicitly manipulated the attentional
engagement of both car experts and novices. Participants were
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discrimination) and car-selective activity (expressed as the difference
between percent signal change for cars and the mean of percent signal
change of the other two categories tested) in the four independently
defined regions used in that study (for details see Harel et al., 2010): FFA,
early visual cortex, object-selective cortex and scene-selective cortex.
Together, the distributed expertise effects (a, b) and the widespread
correlations between expertise and car selectivity (c) strongly suggest that
the expertise effect reported by McGugin et al. reflects attentional
engagement.

presented with interleaved images of cars and airplanes but were
instructed to attend only to cars in one half of the trials, and to
attend only to airplanes the other half of the trials, responding
whenever they saw an immediate image repeat in the attended category only. A purely perceptual view of expertise as an automatic
process would predict that the spatial extent of expert car-selective
activation would be similar in both conditions, that is, irrespective
of the engagement of the experts (Gauthier et al., 2000; Tarr
and Gauthier, 2000). Contrary to this prediction, experts showed
widespread selectivity for cars only when they were task-relevant
(Figure 3, top row). When the same car images were presented,
but were task-irrelevant, the car selectivity in experts diminished
considerably, to the extent that there were almost no differences
between the experts and novices (Figure 3, bottom row). These
findings strikingly demonstrate that the neural activity characteristic of visual object expertise reflects the enhanced engagement
of the experts rather than the mandatory operation of perceptual,
stimulus-driven expert recognition mechanisms.
Further support for the role of attention comes from a behavioral study showing expert categorization of even car fragments
involves top-down mechanisms (Harel et al., 2011). Specifically,
when car experts categorized car fragments of intermediate complexity varying in their diagnostic value (Ullman et al., 2002;
Harel et al., 2007), they did not utilize the information differently
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FIGURE 3 | The effect of attentional engagement on the neural
correlates of expertise. Data from Harel et al. (2010), Experiment 2
demonstrating that when experts are attending to their category of
expertise (high engagement, top row), there are widespread effects of
expertise compared with novices. However, these effects diminish
drastically when car experts (compared with novices) engagement is drawn
toward another object category (low engagement, bottom row). For further
details see Harel et al. (2010).

from novices, as might have been expected had their perceptual
representations changed, but rather showed a general enhancement of response speed, indicative of a general bias or attentional effect. Further, when car experts search for cars among
other common objects, they show a more efficient deployment
of attention to cars relative to other object targets. The efficiency
of visual search can be assessed by calculating search slopes, that
is, estimating the linear increase in search speed as a function
of the number of distractors displayed, with less efficient search
resulting in greater increase in reaction times with increasing
display size (Wolfe, 1994). Accordingly, car experts showed a
shallower search slopes for objects from their domain of expertise
relative to objects they are not experts with, suggesting a more
efficient search (Hershler and Hochstein, 2009; Golan et al., 2014).
Interestingly, the search for objects of expertise was still much
less efficient than that for faces, which often result in nearly
flat search slopes (Hershler and Hochstein, 2005), indicative of
automatic and preattentive processing. This difference between
non-face objects of expertise and faces is another demonstration
that expertise in object recognition does not involve automatic
perceptual processing.
While these neuroimaging and behavioral findings highlight
the importance of top-down attention in expertise, experts not
only direct more attention to objects of expertise, they engage
in a multitude of other unique cognitive and affective processes,
including accessing domain-specific knowledge. Ironically, the
central role of top-down cognitive factors in object expertise can
be illustrated in a domain of expertise that has been extensively
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studied from a perceptual perspective (e.g., Gauthier et al., 2000,
2003, 2005; Rossion et al., 2007; Bukach et al., 2010; but see Harel
and Bentin, 2013). However, car experts are also more knowledgeable about cars, both about their shape and function, often
possessing highly-specialized domain-specific knowledge (e.g.,
acceleration, horsepower). We suggest that this domain-specific
conceptual knowledge interacts with and guides the extraction
of visual information (Figure 1C). Several behavioral studies
show that car discrimination ability is highly correlated with
conceptual knowledge of cars (Barton et al., 2009; Dennett et al.,
2012; McGugin et al., 2012a). These behavioral studies converge
on the conclusion that car expertise integrates both visual and
conceptual knowledge (for a similar conclusion, Van Gulick and
Gauthier, 2013).
Finally, in addition to the fMRI studies discussed above which
highlight the role of attentional engagement in car expertise, evidence for the involvement of non-visual factors can also be found
in a structural MRI study. Gilaie-Dotan et al. (2012) showed that
car discrimination ability is positively correlated with increasing
gray matter density in prefrontal cortex. This finding is in contrast
to the prediction of the perceptual view of expertise of specific
changes to category-selective regions in visual cortex.
Taken together, the behavioral, structural and functional imaging studies suggest that when experts view objects from their
domain of expertise, they differ from novices not only in their
stimulus-driven perceptual processing of the objects, but they also
direct more attention to them and access domain-specific knowledge. It is important to note that the interactive view of expert
object recognition does not exclude the involvement of perceptual
mechanisms in expertise that may or may not engage the FFA.
Rather, changes in brain activity induced by expertise with objects
reflect a multitude of interacting factors, both stimulus-driven
and observer-based.
EXAMPLES OF INTERACTIONS WITH TASK-BASED ATTENTION AND
PRIOR KNOWLEDGE IN CHESS EXPERTISE

So far we have discussed evidence for the involvement of attention and conceptual knowledge in expertise, however, studies of
chess expertise suggest that these two factors may operate in
tandem. Chess employs multiple cognitive functions, including
object recognition, conceptual knowledge, memory, and the processing of spatial configurations (Gobet and Charness, 2006).
And while chess expertise has been associated with selective
activations in visual cortex, and in particular FFA (Bilalic et al.,
2011, but see Krawczyk et al., 2011; Righi et al., 2010), a multitude of cortical regions are reported to be active in chess
experts when viewing chessboards (Bilalic et al., 2010, 2012;
Krawczyk et al., 2011). Expert-related activity was found to be
widespread, extending beyond visual cortex to include activations in collateral sulcus (CoS), posterior middle temporal gyrus
(pMTG), occipitotemporal junction (OTJ), supplementary motor
area (SMA), primary motor cortex (M1), and left anterior insula.
These regions have been suggested to support pattern recognition, perception of complex relations, and action-related functional knowledge of chess objects (Bilalic et al., 2010). The exact
nature of the interactions between the different areas supporting
chess expertise is yet to be determined, especially how visual
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information is utilized and accessed by higher-level cognitive processes ubiquitous to chess, such as problem solving and decisionmaking.
Critically, Bilalic and colleagues demonstrated that task context and prior knowledge play an essential role in driving cortical
activations in chess experts (Bilalic et al., 2010, 2011, 2012). The
expert-specific pattern of activation manifested only when the
task was specific to the domain of expertise (e.g., searching for
particular chess pieces), and not when a comparable control task
was used (i.e., a task that did not require the recognition of particular chess pieces) with identical visual input. In other words, there
was little activity that distinguished experts and novices when they
were not engaged, directly echoing the findings of Harel et al.
(2010). Further, activity in some of the visual areas that displayed
task-specific expertise effects (e.g., CoS) were also modulated by
prior knowledge, demonstrated in a lower magnitude of response
when the chess displays represented random, impossible chess
positions relative to possible ones.
INTERACTIONS IN OTHER DOMAINS OF EXPERTISE

The interactive view of expert object recognition can be expanded
to account for the neural manifestations of other types of expertise involving visual information based on the totality of the
cognitive processes they recruit. In essence, the interactive view
suggests that expertise is supported by a multitude of brain areas,
the identity of which determined by the informational demands
imposed by the particular domain of expertise. Critically, these
different brain areas do not operate independently, as activity
in one area is mutually constrained by activity in the others,
reflecting the interactive nature of visual processing in general,
and expertise in particular.
The interactive view is supported by the extensive and varied activations observed for many domains of expertise (e.g.,
architecture: Kirk et al., 2009; reading musical notation: Wong
and Gauthier, 2010; archery: Kim et al., 2011; basketball: Abreu
et al., 2012). Critically, the specific networks involved are defined
by the diagnostic information for those domains. For example,
professional basketball players also excel at anticipating the consequences of the actions of other players (i.e., success of free shots
at a basket: Aglioti et al., 2008), reflected in activations in frontal
and parietal areas traditionally involved in action observation, as
well as in the extrastriate body area (EBA, a body-selective region
in a occipitotemporal cortex: Downing et al., 2001), probably due
to their expert reading of the observed action kinematics (Abreu
et al., 2012).
Whereas many examples of visual expertise involve recognition
of objects or discrete stimuli, expertise can also be found for largescale spatial environments, for example taxi drivers navigating
London (Woollett et al., 2009). Structural MRI studies have
reported an increased hippocampal volume in taxi drivers relative
to controls (Maguire et al., 2000; Woollett and Maguire, 2011).
Importantly, these changes in hippocampus were not observed in
London bus drivers with equivalent driving experience, indicating
that specific navigation strategies interact with experience in
producing changes to neural substrates (Maguire et al., 2006).
However, in accord with the interactive view, the hippocampus is
not the only region involved in navigation expertise. For example,
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visual inspection of landmark objects in city scenes by London
taxi drivers (Spiers and Maguire, 2006) results in widespread
patterns of activation along the dorsal (Kravitz et al., 2011) and
ventral (Kravitz et al., 2013) visual pathways, as well as parahippocampal cortex, retrosplenial cortex, and various prefrontal
structures all strongly associated with scene processing (Epstein,
2008), navigation, and spatial processing generally (Kravitz et al.,
2011). Of course, all of these areas are strongly interconnected
with the hippocampus, and thus constitute a network wherein
multiple types of information are integrated to support complex
spatial behavior.
Reading is an example of a domain in which the neural
substrates supporting the interaction between conceptual and
perceptual processing may be more predictable. Reading is a
means of accessing the language system through vision, hence,
involving the activation of multiple brain regions and interconnections supporting the processing and representation of different
types of linguistic information (phonological, lexical, semantic;
for a review, see Price, 2012). The visual component of reading, word processing, has been primarily linked to experiencedependent activations in ventral occipitotemporal cortex (Baker
et al., 2007; Wong et al., 2009a; Dehaene et al., 2010) in a region
often referred to as the Visual Word Form Area (VWFA; for a
review see Dehaene and Cohen, 2011). Exemplifying the interaction between orthography and other language systems, VFWA
activity following training with novel orthography was found to
represent not only visual form, but also phonological and semantic information (Xue et al., 2006). In contrast to face-selective
activation, which is typically stronger in the right relative to the
left hemisphere, VWFA shows the opposite lateralization, with
stronger responses in the left hemisphere. To explain the relative
locations of face- and word-selective regions, Plaut, Behrmann
and colleagues proposed a competitive interaction between face
and word representation for foveally-biased cortex, constrained
by the need to integrate reading with the language system that
is primarily left-lateralized (Behrmann and Plaut, 2013; Dundas
et al., 2013). This computational approach, which attempts to
understand how higher-level, non-visual information constrains
category specialization in visual areas, is likely to be a fruitful
avenue for future research.
Together, these studies demonstrate that the neural substrates
of visual expertise extend well beyond visual cortex, and are manifest in regions supporting attention, memory, spatial cognition,
language, and action observation. Importantly, the involvement
of these systems is predictable from their general functions, suggesting that expertise evolves largely within the same systems that
initially process the stimuli. Overall, it is clear that more complex
forms of visual expertise recruit broad and diverse arrays of cortical and subcortical regions. Visual expertise, in its broadest sense,
engages multiple cognitive processes in addition to perception,
and the interplay between these different cognitive systems is what
unites these seemingly different domains of expertise. Notably,
studying the different networks that form the neural correlates
of expertise may inform us of the diverse cognitive processes
involved in particular domains of expertise, as these processes
are often not consciously accessible for the experts themselves
(Palmeri et al., 2004).
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SUMMARY AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Real-world expertise provides a unique opportunity to study
how neural representations change with experience in humans.
In this article, we focused on expertise in visual object recognition, reassessing its common view as a predominantly automatic stimulus-driven perceptual skill that is supported by
category-selective areas in high-level visual cortex. We propose an interactive framework for expert object recognition,
which posits that expertise emerges from multiple interactions
within and between the visual system and other cognitive systems, such as top-down attention and conceptual memory.
These interactions are manifest in widespread distributed patterns of activity across the entire cortex, and are highly susceptible to high-level factors, such as task relevance and prior
knowledge.
While the interactive framework provides a more complete
account of the neural correlates of visual expertise across its
diverse domains, many questions are still open. Having established the involvement of multiple cortical networks in object
expertise, the next natural question is what are the relative
contributions of each of these processes to the unique behavior
displayed by experts. For example, examining the role of topdown attention in expertise, what is the precise effect of the high
engagement of experts with their objects of expertise (inherent to
real world expertise) on the perceptual processing of these objects?
Using experimental paradigms that are known to affect top-down
attention, such as divided attention, will allow researchers to test
the extent of the involvement of top-down attention in expertise.
Further, given the modulation of activation by task relevance, how
do different tasks affect the neural manifestations of expertise?
Similar questions can be asked about the role of conceptual
knowledge in guiding perceptual processing. Of particular interest
here is how accumulating knowledge over time interacts with and
affects the way experts extract information from their objects of
expertise.
Finally, it should be noted that the great advantage provided
by studying real-world expertise—its high ecological validity—
also poses a real challenge. How can the perceptual elements be
teased apart from the other high-level top-down factors in realworld experts, which possess both qualities? One potential way to
address this challenge is by studying long-term expertise in more
controlled settings, which allow the researcher to tease apart the
different factors involved in a particular domain of expertise. For
example, one can study the time course of intensive, relatively
short-term training with real world objects while controlling the
visual input, the conceptual knowledge, and the level of engagement to manipulate the relationship between conceptual and
sensory information. For example, Weisberg et al. (2007) showed
that training participants to treat novel objects as tools engages
action-related “tool” areas (left intraparietal sulcus and premotor
cortex) that were not active before training or for objects not
treated as tools. These findings demonstrate how a particular
type of experience with objects is incorporated with perceptual
visual information to form new object concepts. This approach
can be extended to further our understanding of complex and
diverse cortical networks and interactions underlying real-world
expertise.
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